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RAPE-SPECIFIC OR GENERAL INTENT CRIME?
The definition of the mental element required for the commission
of a crime provides one of the most difficult problems encountered
in criminal law. Insofar as the mental element is concerned, crimes
are divided into two broad groups: those requiring a specific intent
and those requiring a general intent.' A specific intent crime is one
in which the defendant desires to accomplish the result that consti-
tutes the crime.2 Burglary, for example, requires that the defendant
have a particular state of mind at the time of breaking and entering
another's dwelling in the nighttime; and this state of mind is the
specific intent to commit a felony.3 A general intent crime, on the
other hand, is one that may be committed by a person even though he
does not intend to accomplish the result that constitutes the crime.
4
Murder, for example, may be committed by an act imminently danger-
ous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human
life, although without a premeditated design to effect the death of any
individual.5 Thus, when a defendant shoots into a home in which there
are human beings, and a person is killed as a natural consequence
of his act, he is guilty of murder even though he did not have a specific
intent to kill, but was only recklessly indifferent to human life.6
:The distinction between general and specific intent crimes must be found in
the differences in the definition of the proscribed conduct because "the paramount
fact is that neither common experience nor psychology knows any such actual
phenomenon as 'general intent' that is distinguishable from 'specific intent'." Hall,
Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1064 (1944).
2"Specific Intent-When a crime consists, not merely in doing an act, but in
doing it with a specific intent, the existence of that intent is an essential element.
In such case the existence of criminal intent is not presumed from the commis-
sion of the act, but the specific intent must be proved." Miller, Criminal Law 59
(1934). Justice Holmes defines specific intent by stating that "a deed is not done
with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the
deed." Abrams v. United States, 25o U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (dissenting opinion). For
a clear and concise exposition on specific intent with case references, see Perkins,
Criminal Law 671-74 (1957). See also Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 9o5 (1939).
3Clark and Marshall, Crimes § 405 (5 th ed. 1952).
,"General Intent-Intent Presumed from Act. When a person capable of en-
tertaining criminal intent, acting without justification or excuse, commits an act,
prohibited as a crime, his intention to commit the act constitutes criminal intent. In
such case the existence of the intent is presumed from commission of the act, on the
ground that a person is presumed to intend his voluntary acts and their natural
and probable consequences." Miller, Criminal Law 57 (1934).
ON.Y. Pen. Law § 1o44(2). See United States v. Freeman, 25 Fed. Cas. 12o8, 1211,
No. 15,162 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827).
6People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
CASE COMMENTS
The importance of classifying crimes into one or the other category
becomes apparent when considering the availability of the defense of
voluntary intoxication. It is universally stated that voluntary drunken-
ness is no excuse for crime.7 Furthermore, evidence thereof will in no
way avail one accused of a general intent crime,8 but when a crime
requires a particular state of mind, such as intent to commit a felony
in burglary, or deliberation or premeditation in first degree murder,
evidence of intoxication can be used to show that the defendant did
not have that requisite state of mind.9 However, when a homicide
has been committed by the accused, voluntary intoxication, standing
alone as a defense, will at best preclude the existence of the premedi-
tation and deliberation necessary to first degree murder, and will
therefore require a conviction of second degree murder or manslaugh-
ter;10 but the homicide will never be excused where voluntary intox-
ication is the only defense.11
In determining whether rape is a general or specific intent crime,
XVheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946); Helms v. State, 254
Ala. 14, 47 So. 2d 276 (1950); People v. Dorman, 28 Cal. 2d 846, 172 P.2d 686 (1946);
Weaver v. State, 86 Ga. App. 699, 71 S.E.2d 9o (1952); Commonwealth v. Farrell,
322 Mass. 6o6, 78 N.E.ad 697 (1948); Perry v. State, 116 Tex. Grim. 226, 33 S.W.ad
1072 (1930); Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin 144, 168 Eng. Rep. ixo8 (1835).
8Proctor v. United States, 177 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (using automobile
without consent of the owner); Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 17 So. 2d 283
(1944) (assault and battery); Abbott v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 423, 28 S.W.2d 486
(1930) (rape); Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697 (1948) (as-
sault and battery); State v. Scarborough, 55 N.M. 201, 230 P.2d 235 (1951) (rape);
Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1954) (second degree murder). Of
course, the defense of insanity induced by intoxication would still be available.
See Miller, Criminal Law 138 (1934).
"Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679, 4 So. ad 311 (1941) (first degree murder); People
v. Henderson, 138 Cal. App. 2d 505, 292 P.2d 267 (1956) (burglary); People v. Freed-
man, 4 Ill. 2d 414, 123 N.E.2d 317 (1954) (taking immoral, improper, and indecent
liberties with a female child); People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140
(1955) (assault with intent to rape). Missouri and Vermont refuse to take intoxica-
tion into account in determining whether the defendant had the specific intent
requisite to constitute the crime charged. State v. Shipman, 354 Mo. 265, 189
S.W.ad 273 (1945); State v. Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S.W. 1111 (19o4); State v.
Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 16o Atl. 257 (1932); State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 (1878).
'Ray v. State, 257 Ala. 418, 59 So. 2d 582, 584 (1952) (dictum); People v. Burk-
hart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 Pac. 11, 13 (1931) (dictum); Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113,
9 So. 835, 845-46 (1891); State v. Wilson, 234 Iowa 6o, 11 N.W.2d 737, 746 (1943).
Thirty-eight states have passed statutes defining first degree murder. For an ex-
amination of the intent necessary under each statute see Keedy, A Problem of
First Degree Murder: Fisher v. United States, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267, 268-69 (1950).
"Kriel v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 362 (1869); Choate v. State, 19
Okla. Grim. 169, 197 Pac. io6o (1921); Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 S.W.ad
385 (1941).
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the English case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard12 merits
consideration. The defendant in perpetration of the rape of a young
girl put his hand over her mouth to stifle her cries and suffocated her.
On an indictment for murder, his defense was that he was so drunk
that he did not know his acts to be dangerous. He was convicted of
murder and the conviction sustained. However, in the course of his
opinion, Lord Birkenhead said, "My lords, drunkenness in this case
could be no defence unless it could be established that Beard at the
time of committing the rape was so drunk that he was incapable of
forming the intent to commit it .... ,13 This seems to imply that rape
requires a specific intent, but Professor Stroud, in condemning this
statement in the Beard case, declares, "How could a man committing a
rape be 'so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent to com-
mit it'? In such a mental condition, he would be as harmless as a log,
and incapable of committing the active crime in question. Even if it
were possible for him to do so, the admission of such an excuse would
be contrary.., to the whole collection of authorities which exclude
drunkenness as a defence for crime in general."'
4
The difficulties involved in classifying rape as a specific or general
intent crime are indicated in People v. Cheai-y,' 5 decided by the Su-
preme Court of California. The defendant testified that a prolonged
period of drinking from early afternoon until one o'clock the follow-
ing morning resulted in a loss of memory from the time he left
a tavern until the time he was handcuffed by police officers. The
state's evidence showed that after the defendant left the tavern, he
went to the home of the deceased and her daughter, apparently for
the purpose of having sexual relations with the daughter. When denied
admittance by the younger woman, the defendant broke through the
locked door, the daughter meanwhile escaping to the home of a neigh-
bor. When the police arrived, the mother was found badly beaten and
dying. The bed covers were down to her waist, and her gown was open
to below the breast. There was a bruise on her groin and three small
semicircular depressions on her thigh, but the pathologist found no
evidence of rape. The state obtained a conviction of murder in the
first degree on a felony murder theory: that death could have resulted
either from a rape or an attempt to rape the deceased, or in perpetra-
tion of burglary-breaking and entering with the intent to rape the
daughter. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sus-
1[192o] A.C. 479.
"Id. at 504-05.
"Stroud, Constructive Murder and Drunkenness, 36 L.Q. Rev. 268, 272 (1920).
548 Cal. 2d 301, 309 P.2d 431 (1957).
CASE COMMENTS
tain the conviction. In the course of its opinion a majority of the court
said: "It is true that if defendant was so intoxicated that -he did not
have the specific intent to rape, he is not guilty of murder in the first
degree .... Whether defendant was so intoxicated, however, was a ques-
tion for the jury."16
The suggestion by the court in the Cheary case that rape is a
specific intent crime17 is subject to criticism on four different grounds.
Firstly, if rape is a specific intent crime, then the particular state
of mind necessary to the crime must be established. However, the tra-
ditional definitions of rape 18 contain no requirement of specific intent
such as is set forth in the definitions of recognized specific intent
crimes.19 These specific intent crimes all require something more than
"People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 3oi, 309 P.2d 431, 435 (1957) (Emphasis added).
The dissenting judge said, "I am convinced that the evidence was not sufficient
to give rise to an inference that he intended to perpetrate rape on either Mrs.
Inglet [the daughter] or Mrs. McDonald [the deceased]." Id. at 44o (dissenting
opinion).
It is submitted that the evidence was dearly conflicting so as to present a
question of fact for the jury as to the intent of the defendant. It appears also
that the dissenting judge ignored the prevailing California law as to the defense
of voluntary intoxication: "No act committed by a person while in a state of
voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such con-
dition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or in-
tent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime,
the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the
time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the
act." Cal Pen. Code § 22. See also People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 297 Pac. 11 (1931).
11In its entire opinion the court never distinguished the intent necessary for
the crime of rape from the intent necessary for an attempted rape. Moreover, since
the facts indicate that a rape may have been committed, the reader is led to be-
lieve that the court felt no distinction exists and that both rape and an attempt
to rape require a specific intent.
" "Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will
People v. Cieslak, 319 Ill. 221, 149 N.E. 815, 816 (1925); Rape is "unlawful carnal
knowledge of a woman without her consent." Adams v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 711,
294 S.W. 151, 152 (1927); "Rape is the carnal knowledge of any woman above
the age of consent against her will, and of a female child under the age of con-
sent with or against her will; its essence is the felonious and violent penetra-
tion of the person of the female ...." Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178
N.E. 633, 634 (1931); "'Rape' consists in accomplishing the act of sexual inter-
course by force and against the will of the female assaulted." Starr v. State, 2o5
Wis. 31o, 247 N.W. 96, 97 (1931)-
w'Larceny is the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal prop-
erty of another with intent to steal the same." Perkins, Criminal Law 190 (1957)-
"[B]urglary is the nocturnal breaking into the dwelling house of another with in-
tent to commit a felony." Id. at 149. "[R]obbery is 'the felonious and forcible tak-
ing from the person of another any goods or money of any value, by violence or
putting in fear.' The word 'felonious,' used in connection with the taking of prop-
erty, means a taking with intent to steal." Id. at 236. "[A]rson is the malicious burn-
1958]
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the intentional commission of an unlawful act. The act must be accom-
panied by a state of mind whereby the actor intends that certain addi-
tional consequences will result from his unlawful act. For example,
when a person breaks and enters the dwelling of another in the night-
time, he commits an unlawful act; but he does not commit burglary un-
less he breaks and enters with the intent to commit a felony. If the state
can prove that the accused intended to perpetrate a felony, it makes
no difference whether the felony was actually committed.2 0 For rape to
be a specific intent crime, and to be consistent with the requirements
thereof, there must be an act which is unlawful or harmful to society,
and the actor would have to intend an additional result, although it
need never be achieved. It becomes apparent that it is difficult to
conceive of an additional consequence that must be intended, much less
consummated, while the defendant is engaging in sexual intercourse by
force and against the will of a woman.
Secondly, if rape is a specific intent crime, then evidence of in-
toxication should be allowed to show that the defendant did not have
the requisite state of mind necessary to the crime of rape. Consequent-
ly, a defendant could offer evidence of drunkenness to show that he
thought the woman had consented, and the evidence would indicate
that he did not have the particular state of mind to accomplish a
crime of violence against a woman. The result, of course, would be to
introduce into the law of rape the defense of mistake of fact resulting
from drunkenness, for where any crime requires a specific intent, even
ing of the dwelling house of another." Id. at 172. "A criminal attempt is a step to-
wards a criminal offense with specific intent to commit that particular crime."
Id. at 476. "'[A]ssault with intent' [crimes] are almost the same as ... criminal at-
tempt .... In this type of aggravated assault the intent with which it was alleged
to have been committed is a 'specific intent' which must be proved." Id. at 502.
A first degree murder statute may require specific intent. "All murder, which is
perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree...."
Cal. Pen. Code § 189. When such a statute refers to a willful, deliberate, or pre-
meditated killing, a specific intent is necessary. Note, however, that a general in-
tent may be all that is required under the felony murder provisions of a statute.
Other criminal offenses which require specific intent include: any act which
must be done fraudulently (such as forgery, obtaining property by false pretenses),
or corruptly (such as perjury), or knowingly (such as receiving stolen property know-
ing it to have been stolen). Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905,
927 (1939).
2OThis reasoning seems to apply when murder requires a specific intent. In
that situation the act of killing would no more satisfy this requirement than
would the act of breaking and entering satisfy the requirements for burglary.
In burglary the actor must break and enter with intent to commit a felony. In
this type of first degree murder the actor must kill with intent to satisfy a pre-
meditated and deliberated design.
CASE COMMENTS
an unreasonable mistake of fact is a defense if it precludes the requisite
intent.
21
Thirdly, if rape is a specific intent crime, an examination of a typi-
cal statute creating the felony murder doctrine is necessary.22 In
those cases in which the prosecution seeks to establish guilt of first de-
gree murder on the ground that it was committed in the perpetration
of one of the enumerated felonies, guilt of this particular felony must
be clearly shown. In the case of People v. Koerber23 the defendant
killed the deceased while he was in the act of robbing him. His defense
was, as in the Cheary case, that he was intoxicated at the time and
did not know what he was doing. The trial court's conviction of first
degree murder was reversed and a new trial ordered by the New York
Court of Appeals because the jury was not given an opportunity to
find the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of homicide. The theory
of the appellate court was that since the defendant was alleged to have
been in the act of robbing the deceased, the state would have to prove
a specific intent to rob before a conviction could be sought under the
felony murder doctrine. 24 Applying this principle to the crime of rape,
if the suggestion by the court of the Cheary case is to be accepted, it
follows that if the state offers conclusive evidence that acts normally
constituting rape have been committed, the state, in order to secure
a murder conviction for the death of the rape victim, must further
prove that the defendant had the specific intent to rape. Therefore, if
the defendant was so drunk that he did not have the specific intent to
rape, he would not be guilty of rape even though he went through
the external motions and physically succeeded in the unlawful carnal
knowledge of the woman by force and against her will. Consequently,
n"The ultimate question in any prosecution is whether or not all the essential
elements of guilt are established. If any such element is found wanting, guilt has
not been substantiated; and hence if proof of a mistake of fact, even without the
support of reasonable grounds, negatives the existence of such an element, it also
disproves the charge itself." Perkins, Criminal Law 827 (1957). Conversely, if a crime
merely requires a general intent, mistake of fact is not a defense unless it is based
upon reasonable grounds. McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775 (1888); Mul-
reed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 7 N.E. 884 (1886); State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178
So. 343 (1938); Hamilton v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 96, 29 S.W.2d 777 (1930).
"'All murder... which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to per-
petrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the first de-
gree...." Cal. Pen. Code § 189.
1244 N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926).
"4Compare the Koerber case with Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65
A.2d 353 (1949), in which a first degree murder conviction was affirmed in spite of
the fact that no charge as to the presence of the necessary specific intent to consti-
tute the felony of robbery, on which the conviction was based, was given.
195 8 ]
134 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV
the felony murder requirement would not be satisfied, and the state
would have to settle for a lesser conviction.
25
Fourthly, if rape were a specific intent crime, so that evidence of
voluntary intoxication could be used to preclude that intent, the most
detrimental effect on society would be to create a situation in which
drunkenness could be an excuse for acts which would otherwise con-
stitute rape. For example, if the state fails to prove premeditation or
deliberation in a prosecution for statutory first degree murder, the
proper verdict will normally be second degree murder, which only
requires a general intent under most statutory divisions of murder.26
Likewise, if the state proves all elements of the crime of burglary, ex-
cept the intent to commit a felony, the defendant will be guilty of
unlawful breaking and entering.27 But if the state in a prosecution for
rape should prove all elements of the crime of rape except the specific
intent to rape, it follows that the defendant would be guilty of no
crime greater than assault and battery. Voluntary intoxication would
thus excuse rape as an independent crime.
It is submitted that rape cannot be a specific intent crime. For that
reason, voluntary intoxication, short of rendering a person insane,
should never be a defense for any criminal who violently and un-
lawfully penetrates the person of a female. The commission of those
acts which constitute rape gives rise to a conclusive presumption of
the existence of the intent to commit the crime; and the fact that the ac-
cused may have been devoid of inhibition as the result of his alcoholic
stupefication is without importance.
OWEN A. NEFF
2If rape is a general intent crime, as it is normally classified, evidence of in-
toxication cannot be considered, and the state would only have to allege and prove
that a rape was committed and that a homicide resulted in the course of its perpe-
tration. Then, a conviction of first degree murder would be sustained under the
felony murder doctrine because "when criminal intent in general is all that need
be established, the drunken defendant is treated as if he knew the consequences of
his acts...." People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, x55 N.E. 79, 81 (1926).
Those cases that hold that rape requires a general intent include McGuinn
v. United States, 191 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Abbott v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky.
428, 28 S.W.2d 486 (1930); State v. Scarborough, 55 N.M. 201, 230 P.2d 235 (1951);
Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 S.W.2d 385 (1941).
'See note io supra.
7For a comprehensive study of the statutory variations of common law bur-
glary see Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 1009 (1951).
